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STATE OF 
SUPREME 
CONSOLIDATED FINANCE 
CORPORATION, 
vs. 
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KENT MOULTON, dba SOUTH 
DA \'IS CAMPER SALES, and 
~HD-CENTURY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a foreign corporation, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
UTAH 
COURT 
Case 
No. 
12266 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATElVIENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sought in the Trial Court judgment 
against a bonding company and a used camper sales-
man for the sale price of a used trailer which the 
~alesman sold. The salesman collected and converted 
the sales price. Plaintiff's claim is based on Section 
H-3-16, U.C.A., which requires the bonding company 
to guarantee that the dealer will conduct his business 
without fraud. 
1 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following the trial of this matter, Trial Court 
granted a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with 
prejudice and upon the merits, and denied plaintiff 
any relief vvhatsoever. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Trial Court's judg-
ment and an order entering judgment in its favor and 
against defendants for the balance owing fr.om the 
sale price of the trailer, an agreed figure of $2,206.60, 
plus costs and attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this matter are simple and to a large 
extent undisputed. 
Plaintiff's claim is based on the requirements of 
Section 41-3-16, Utah Code Annotated, which requires 
a dealer in campers to provide a bond conditioned 
upon him conducting his business as a dealer without 
fraud or fraudulent representation. Kent Moulton, 
dba South Davis Camper Sales, was such a dealer, and 
Mid-Century Insurance Company furnished the bond 
guaranteeing his freedom from fraud and fraudulent 
representation. 
Early in 196 7 plaintiff repossessed a trailer in 
Pioche, Nevada and arranged with Moulton to pick 
the trailer up and bring it to his trailer sales locati.on 
in Davis County. Moulton picked up the trailer and 
2 
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brought it to his yard. Title to the trailer was kept 
by plaintiff during the period that it was in the yard 
(R. 4~2). In May of 1967 Moulton advised plaintiff's 
agent Allen that he had a sale for the trailer and 
needed the title to deliver to the buyer of the trailer 
( R. 42). Plaintiff delivered the title and received a 
check, Exhibit P-2, in payment for the net of the sale 
price of the trailer CR. 42). The check was deposited 
in the bank but dishonored for insufficient funds. 
Plaintiff's agent checked with the bank on which 
the Exhibit P-2 was drawn and was advised that it 
was not good. The check was held for several days to 
get information as to its collectibility and finally put 
in to plaintiff's bank for collection CR. 64). Collec-
ti.on efforts were continued and Moulton finally per-
sonally contacted plaintiff's manager, Allen, and 
said, "Well, there had been a mix-up at the bank," 
and "rather than send it back, I will give you another 
one and you take and run it through and it will be 
all right." ( R. 65). Plaintiff then received a second 
check for $4, 700.00, which is Exhibit P-6. This check 
was made directly to Consolidated's agent, Clyde 
Allen, but was actually the plaintiff's money (R. 65). 
Plaintiff continued to make efforts to collect and 
finally, through a number .of small payments, col-
lected $2,493AO, leaving a balance owing to plaintiff 
of $2,206.60 (R. 68). 
Plaintiff's witness Allen testified that there was 
no arrangement for credit to Moulton for the pur-
e hase price of the trailer ( R. 42-43). Moulton did 
not testify to any arrangement for extension of credit. 
3 
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There is no question that plaintiff placed the 
trailer with the dealer for sale. The dealer agreed 
to sell it and pay the net received to the owner CR. 74-
75). The title was surrendered upon the representa-
tion by defendant Moulton that he had sold the , 
trailer and needed title to complete the transaction 
CR. 75). There was no evidence of any agreement on 
the part of plaintiff to extend credit to Moulton for 
the ainount due from the sale of the trailer (R. 76). 
Moulton converted the money to his own 
account. There never was sufficient money in his 
account to pay plaintiff. Moulton had no arrange· 
ments with the bank to honor the check. Although 
the bank did have arrangements with defendant 
Moulton to finance or floor the purchase by him of 
new trailers, they had no agreement to finance or 
floor the purchase of this used trailer CR. 49-50-51). 
Moulton testified that he had a man pick up 
the trailer CR. 79). He had it in his yard for two or 
three months. Obtained the title and warranty papers 
on it before he had a sale for it CR. 80) . Originally the 
trailer was offered for $5,500.00, but the price reduced 
when no offers were received to $5,000.00. The 
$4,700.00 check for the net on the trailer sales was 
picked up in Bountiful CR. 80). Moulton testified he 
advised Allen that the check wasn't good at the timr 
he delivered it to him, but that the check was de-
livered on the date it bears, May 26th CR. 81). He 
also testified that when the second check was de· 
livered he advised Allen that it was not good CR. 81) · 
' After both checks had bounced, Moulton discussed 
4 
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with Allen putting the balance on a contract and 
letting it be paid monthly, but this was not done and 
'.\1oulton went broke and didn't pay any more than 
the amounts collected CR. 81). 
Moulton collected the $5,000.00 sale price in 
March, 1967, he testified CR. 82). He did not give 
Allen, Consolidated's agent, a check until May. 
Moulton ran the money from the sale price of the 
trailer through his South Davis account and does not 
recall whether he advised Allen about the sale and 
the receipt of the $5,000.00 when the transaction 
occurred CR. 82). Allen, the agent for Consolidated 
who handled the transaction with defendant Moul-
ton, testified that he had no recollection or reference 
that Moulton ever advised him that the checks when 
rlelivered were not good, and that it was only a few 
days after he had delivered title that the check was 
received in the mail CR. 86-87). Moulton testified 
also that at the time the figure on the trailer was 
arrived at, he intended to pay Allen for the trailer 
(R. 87). 
There is no evidence of an agreement between 
plaintiff and Moulton to sell the trailer to Moulton. 
The court, in its memorandum decision and findings, 
found that the relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant Moulton was one of seller and purchaser 
( R. 30). Court places great emphasis on the fact that 
after Moulton had delivered the two insufficient 
funds checks, his attempts to pay off the checks before 
he went broke shows an intention not to defraud 
1R. 30). 
5 
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In the court's Finding No. 3, CH. 91), the 
court finds that Moulton sold the trailer on or about 
the 26th of May, 1967 for the sum .of $5,000.00. There 
is no evidence \Yhatsoever that this \Vas the date when 
it was sold. This finding contradicts Moulton's own 
evidence ( R. 82). 
Conclusion No. 1, that tlw relationship was that 
of seller and purchaser, is without support of any 
evidence and contrary to the testimony .of both parties 
to the transaction. Even if the court is correct that 
the relationship was seller and purchaser, the giving 
of the insufficient funds check was a fraudulent pay-
ment by purchaser of the pure hase price. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MOULTON, AS A MATTER OF LAW, CON-
DUCTED HIS BUSINESS AS A DEALER 
FRAUDULENTLY. 
Plaintiff submits that the Trial Court completely 
misconceived the law applicable to the operations of 
automobile dealer and failed to apply the provisions 
of Section 41-3-16, Utah Code Annoted, as intended 
by the legislature of the State of Utah. 
The evidence in several areas shows fraudulent 
conduct on the part of Moulton. The evidence is 
undisputed, uncontradicted, and clear and convinc-
ing. 
6 
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( a J Moulton s.old the trailer and collected 
$~,000.00 on the sale price in March, 1967 
without advising the plaintiff of the sale or 
collection ( R. 82 J. 
It is undisputed, since it is the testimony of 
Moulton himself, that he collected the proceeds 
fr.om the sale two months before he told the 
plaintiff about the sale. There is no question 
about this matter since it is Moulton's own 
testimony on cross-examination. There is no 
question a bout the date of the check for 
$4,700.00 since it bears the date of May 26th 
and was delivered within a few days of the 
elate it bears CR. 42). 
Since this is defendant Moulton's own testi-
mony and the check is a document clear on 
its face, it is submitted by plaintiff that this is 
clear and convincing evidence, undisputed, and 
must be considered as the basis for a finding as 
a matter of law that Moulton engaged in a 
fraudulent transaction. 
( b) Moulton delivered a check on May 26th 
or shortly thereafter bearing date of May 26th 
at a time when he did not have money avail-
able in the bank to pay the check. There is no 
question the check was not postdated. Moulton 
claims that he advised Allen, agent of plaintiff, 
that the check was not good, but Allen denies 
that any representation of this kind was made. 
As a matter of fact, the check was delivered 
through the mail, according to Allen, and no 
conversation occurred at which there could be 
a contradiction of the face of the check itself 
which shows no evidence of postdating. 
(c) Under (a) and (b), by the defendant 
lVIoulton's own admissions, he was guilty of the 
7 
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crime of e1nbezzlement as defined in 76-17-5. 
Utah Code Annotated, which defines said act as 
''e~ery person entrusted with any property as 
bailee, tenant or lodger, or with any power of 
attorney for the sale or transfer thereof, whD 
fraudulently converts the same, or the proceed~ 
thereof, to his own use, or secretes it with a 
fraudulent intent to convert it to his own use. 
is guilty of embezzlement." 
It is undisputed, uncontradicted and admitted 
by Moulton under .oath that, without Consolidated's 
knowledge, he sold Consolidated's trailer, received 
$5,000.00, put it in his bank account, and two months 
later gave a bum check for the proceeds of the sale. 
In doing these acts, he engaged in a series of fraudu-
lent acts and conducted his dealer's business in a 
fraudulent manner, converting plaintiff's property. 
which subjected the bonding company to liability £01 
the loss caused to plaintiff. The evidence is clear, co11-
v1ncmg, and uncontra<licted of this frauduknt 
conduct. 
It becon1es even more obvious that there was a11 
intention to defraud when one takes into considera-
tion the fact that Moulton never did make the chf'ck 
good. He converted plaintiff's funds to other purposes. 
There was no effort on his part to postdate or get an 
agreement for an extension of credit for the pure hasr 
price of the trailer. Section 76-20-11, Utah Code 
Annotated, makes the drawing of insufficient funds 
checks a crime and provides: 
8 
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.. The making, drawing, uttering, or delivering 
of such check, draft, or order as aforesaid shall 
be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud." 
( cU The giving of the check dated June 26th 
Exhibit P-6, again was the violation of th~ 
criminal code because once more the check 
was not paid and was drawn against insuffi-
cient funds. The same argument in (a) and 
Cb) would be true of this check since it ob-
tained an extension of credit, permitting him 
to use plaintiff's money for additional time. 
The only alleviating circumstance that is present 
to contradict the clear, convincing evidence that 
Woulton intended to defraud Consolidated is that 
after he had converted the vehicle and used the pro-
ceeds from its sale in his business, he attempted to 
pay back the $4,700.00 which he had obtained fraud-
ulently. Was there ever a converter who acted other-
wis<:> when caught in the act? 
The record is replete with other evidence of 
vvrongdoing by Moulton in the manner in which he 
appropriated the proceeds from the sale of plaintiff's 
trailer. One could not argue fairly that the evidence 
is not clear and convincing. The four points made 
in la), (b), (c) and Cd) are cases where there is no 
contradiction in the evidence as to what happened. 
The case closest on the facts and law which 
plc=iintiff has been able to find in its research is Com-
ml"rcial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey 
'" Watson, 261 F. 2d 143, (Tenth Cir.). This case 
came out of New Mexico to the Tenth Circuit and the 
9 
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language of the licensing statute contained the 
language that is in the Utah Code. Judge Murrah 
discussed several cases. The circumstances under 
which the claim against the bonding company arose 
in the Commercial Insurance case are so similar to 
this case that a recitation of Murrah's opinion on the 
point may be helpful: 
"Import was a wholesale dealer in foreign 
automobiles. Powell represented to Import's 
Manager that he had a sale for a Volkswagen 
and induced Import to give him possession of 
it and to deposit the title papers in the Los 
Alamos branch of a Santa Fe Bank with a sight 
draft for the purchase price in the sum of 
$1,625. The title papers so deposited consisted 
of an assignment from the original nonresident 
owner by power of attorney to Import's Man-
ager, and a "reassignment .of title by registered 
dealer" from Import to Powell's Downtown 
Auto Sales at Santa Fe. When the sight draft 
was not paid, Powell instructed Import to draw 
another draft for the amount of the purchase 
price, with title attached, on another bank 
where he usually did business, and through 
which he would "floor-plan" the car. Import 
finally instructed the bank to release title to 
Powell without payment of the draft, but to re-
turn the attached power of attorney. In a sub-
sequent telephone conversation, Import com-
plained of nonreceipt of payment and Powell 
professed not to understand why payment had 
not been made by the bank, and said that he 
would go to the bank and see what was up. 
Several days later, Powell sold the automobile 
and delivered the certificate of title and a bill 
of sale. Powell died shortly thereafter without 
having ever paid Import for the purchase price 
10 
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of the automobile. When the purchaser of the 
automobile from Powell was unable to secure 
transfer of title because of the absence of the 
power of attorney from the original owner 
Import then delivered the power of attorney~ 
clear the title and took an assignment of the 
purchaser's claim against Powell." 
"The appellant also challenges the sufficiency 
of the evidence to prove fraudulent conduct by 
the requisite clear and convincing evidence, 
especially since the person to whom the fraud 
is attributable is dead. And see Pacific Royalty 
Co. v. Williams, 1 Cir., 227 F. 2d 49, 55. But 
we think Powell's actions in obtaining posses-
sion of the automobile and then title for the 
ostensible purpose of "floor-planning" the car 
at a bank, when considered in the light of his 
later professions not to know why payment had 
not been made by the bank, though he had not 
negotiated the agreed financing, certainly 
indicate an intent to defraud his seller. Indeed, 
it was quite sufficient to justify the court's 
finding of fraudulent conduct." 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT MISCONCEIVED THE 
NATURE OF THE FRAUD REQUIRED TO SUP-
PORT A JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff's claim against defendant Moulton and 
defendant's bonding company, Mid-Century Insur-
ance Company, is based on a regulatory statute of 
the State of Utah, Section 41-3-16. As far as appli-
cable to the cause of action, said statute reads as 
follows: 
11 
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Mot~r .dealers ''shall procure and file with the 
admm1strator a good and sufficient bond in the 
amount of $5_,000.00 with corporate surety 
thereon, duly licensed to do business within the 
state of Utah, approved as to form by the attor-
ney general of the state of Utah, and condi-
tioned that said applicant shall conduct his 
business as a dealer without fraud or fraudu-
lent representation, and without the violation 
of any pr.ovision of this act." 
There was clearly a violation of the section by 
Moulton in the transaction with plaintiff. His con-
duct may actually have been criminal. He might 
have been convicted of the crime of obtaining proper-
ty by false pretenses. However, that is n.ot what 
plaintiff must show in order to recover against the 
bonding company. 
The regulatory statutes envision a higher level 
of honesty and fair dealing with the public generally 
than where criminal conduct is the concern. This 
fraud is of the nature of the fraud that is a tort. 
Fraud as used in the regulatory statute is the 
kind of fraud that is defined by Corpus Juris Secun· 
dum and cited in the case .of Vogelsang u. Wolpert, 
38 Cal. Rptr. 440, 227 C.A. 2d 102, page 445, where 
the California court was concerned with the fraudu· 
lent obtaining of property without adequate con-
sideration. The court there stated, page 445: 
''Wilful fraud, to borrow a figure from ~lassical 
antiquity, is a hydra-headed monster; its faces 
are various; they may differ one from another 
as markedly as personal and business relation-
12 
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ships are unlike in the modern world but all 
of them have this in common that wilf~l fraud 
is alw~ys instin~t with guile. By false repre-
sentations, knowmgly made, the beneficiary of 
actual fraud has wilfully induced another to 
part with his property without adequate com-
pensation; he has been guilty of overreaching, 
of dishonest gain by misleading another of 
obtaining property under circumstances which 
are unfair and unconscionable and which thr 
law will not tolerate. 
In 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 1, pages 204-205, it is said: 
"Fraud is a generic term which embraces all 
the multifarious means which human ingenu-
ity can devise and are resorted to by one indi-
vidual to gain an advantage over another by 
false suggestions or by suppression of the truth. 
In its general or generic sense, it comprises all 
acts, omissions, and concealments involving a 
breach of legal or equitable duty and resulting 
in damage to another, or the taking of unduf' 
or unconscientious advantage of another; * * * 
"Fraud has also been defined as any cunning~ 
deception, or artifice used to circumvent, cheat. 
or deceive another." 
The kind of fraud that plaintiff submits is 
intended in the bonding provision is also discussed in 
additional California case, Wayne z·. Bureau of 
Private Investigators and Adjusters, Department of 
Professional and Vocational Standards, 20 Cal. Rptr. 
194, 201 C.A. 2d 427. This was a proceeding to 
review an order of suspension of a private investigator 
13 
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and adjuster's license. The basis on which the license 
was suspended was an accusation that the investigator 
and adjuster engaged in "fraud and dishonesty in 
failing to disclose that he was acting in behalf of an 
adverse party." The court in discussing the law 
applicable, stated as follows: 
"(2) Fraud embraces multifarious means 
whereby one person gains an advantage over 
another and means in effect bad faith, dis-
honesty or overreaching. 
"There is no doubt that a false impression 
may consist in a concealment of what is true 
as well as the assertion of what is false. (See 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 242 Ky. 365, 46 S. W. 
2d 474, 477.) The causing or the bringing 
about of false impressions under the circum-
stances constitutes fraud. The petitioner here 
in effect admits that had he refused to give any 
ansvvers to the questions put to him by the 
interviewees with reference to whom he repre-
sented that undoubtedly he would have had to 
return to his office with no statements. He 
elected to suppress or intentionally withhold 
information from the interviewees which, had 
it been given, would have resulted in the inter-
viewees' being fully informed. His motive was 
obvious. It was said in Commonwealth v. 
Smith, supra, at 478: 
"Fraud vitiates whatever it touches. 'It is 
a generic term which embraces all the multi-
farious means which human ingenuity can 
devise and are resorted to by one individual to 
get an advantage .over anot?er. No definite 
and invariable rule can be laid down as a gen· 
eral proposition defining fraud, as it includes 
all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and 
14 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unfair ways by which another is cheated.' 
(Citations) 'Actual fraud' may be discovered 
as f.ollows,. 'when the party intentionally, or by 
design, misrepresents a material fact, or pro-
duces a false impression in order to mislead 
another, or to entrap .or cheat him, or to obtain 
an undue advantage of him; in every such case 
there is positive fraud, in the truest sense of the 
terms.' (Citations) 'The principal difference 
between 'actual' and 'constructive' fraud is 
that in the first case there is an intent to induce 
another to part with property or surrender 
some legal right, while in the other, although 
the act may accomplish that purpose, there is 
no such intent .on the part of the actor.' " 
This court has on several occasions had before 
it the problem of interpreting the bonding law. The 
first case was Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 
P. 2d 749. In this case the court held that the protec-
tion of the statute applied to a person financing auto-
mobile transactions and defrauded when the auto-
mobile dealer converted the proceeds of a loan to his 
own personal use. In the Bates v. Simpson case, it 
was agreed on the appeal that judgment against the 
bonding company in favor of the customer was proper 
(page 170). 
In the case .of Lawrence v. Ward, 5 Utah 2d 257, 
300 P. 2d 619, this court had before it the question of 
whether or not fraud existed which would make the 
bond available to a mortgagee. The fraudulent repre-
sentation by the used car dealer was to a bank em-
ployee that the used car dealer was the owner of the 
automombile, when in fact he was not, and did not 
15 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
have title. The bank <lid not require the dealer to 
exhibit the title to the automobile or deliver it, and 
the bonding company claimed that this was negli-
gence on the bank's part which would bar its recovery 
from the bonding cmnpany for the fraud of the 
dealer. This court, in ruling in favor of the bank, 
made the following holding (Ward is the used car 
dealer): 
''Ward, knowing of the method used by the 
bank in financing his sales, deliberately con-
trived to deceive its agent. This was no mere 
promise or opinion; he stated that he owned 
the automobile, knowing that the agent would 
believe him and act upon his representation. 
Clearly this was fraud and the bank should 
have judgment against the bonding company 
for this amount. 
" ( 5) 2. One Dalton purchased a 1954 Chevo-
let from United Auto Sales and executed his 
note to the Sandy City Bank. A check, payable 
to Dalton and United Auto Sales jointly, was 
sent to the company by the bank and later 
cashed and collected. When the company was 
unable to deliver title, Dalton refused to pay on 
the note because his endorsement .on the check 
was a forgery. The trial court gave judgment 
for the bank against Ward and Selleneit since 
they had received the proceeds of the check. 
A forgery likewise falls within the protection of 
the bond and it is immaterial that the bank 
carried insurance a gain st forgery." 
In the Lawrence LJ. Ward decision, court dis-
cussed the Arizona case of Commercial Standard In-
surance Co. l'. lVest, 74 Ariz. 359, 249, P. 2d 430. The 
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Arizona case expanded the coverage to include the 
people doing other things with the used car dealer 
than buying a car off his lot. The most significant 
aspect of the Commercial Standard case however is 
' ' the holding that a mere conversion of monies is fraud 
within the meaning of the statute and is an act 
covered by the bond. This is the situation in our 
present case as Moulton converted Consolidated's 
money and applied it to his own use. In describing 
the kind of act which is covered by the bond, the 
Arizona Supreme Court stated that: 
" ( 3, 4) The instant statute and bond are not 
limited but are all-inclusive where there has 
been an unlawful act by the dealer, for the 
statute expressly provided that "Such bond 
shall inure to the benefit of any person who 
shall suffer any loss by reason of any unlawful 
act of the licensee." CEmp. sup.) The Supreme 
Court of Louisiana, in the case of Hartman v. 
Greene, 193 La. 234, 190 So. 390, 391, stated: 
"The term 'an unlawful act' does not mean 
necessarily a criminal act; it means a 
wrongful act, or a tort-any wrongful act 
(not involving a breach of contract) for 
which a civil action will lie. * * *" 
Applying this rule to the facts of this case, we 
hold that the surety (appellant) is liable to 
appellee for the conversion by defendant Reid 
of moneys belonging to appellee, as the acts 
complained of arose out of Reid's actions in the 
capacity of a used car dealer. Had the latter 
not been a licensed dealer he would have been 
unable to follow the procedure outlined to pro-
cure for himself the commission out of the re-
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serve fund which was set up at the bank for 
such dealers. We perceive no legal distinction 
between the admitted right of the bank to 
recover on the bond had it suffered a loss and 
the right of the appellee to do likewise." 
Another interesting case arriving at the con-
clusion advocated by plaintiff is State ex rel Mac-
Naughton v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 1 Wis. 2d 
494, 85 N.W. 2d 337. In this case the customer of the 
used car lot had left his automobile to be sold, and 
without his knowledge or consent, the used car 
dealer mortgaged the car to a finance company and 
subsequently sold the car after the bond covering his 
operation had expired. The bonding company de-
fended on the ground that the innocent owner of the 
automobile did not sustain a loss until the sale and 
that the mortgaging of his car did not damage him. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the following 
language, required the bonding company to pay the 
loss to MacNaughton: 
" ( 1, 2) De Witt's act of mortgaging the Mac-
Naughton Pontiac on October 5, 1953, consti-
tuted a fraudulent conversion, - grounds for 
suspension or revocation of his license under 
the statute. That act took place within the 
bond period. Appellant contends that Mac-
N aughton suffered no actual loss, however, 
until the car was sold the following April. We 
cannot agree. MacNaughton's loss was actual 
when the car was mortgaged, whether he knew 
it or not. Appellant argues that the mortgag-
ing caused no more loss to Mac~ a ugh ton t~an 
if DeWitt had taken $10 out of h1s pocket w1th-
out his knowing it, used it for two weeks and 
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then put the money back without his knowl-
edge. The analogy fails because by his act 
DeWitt placed himself in a position where he 
could not "put it back," and where he could 
not perform his contract with MacNaughton. 
After the date of the mortgage MacNaughton's 
interest was subject to the mortgage; he could 
not have prevailed against the mortgage inter-
est of an innocent party." 
This court, in a number of cases not dealing 
directly with automobile dealers or the type of 
transaction between plaintiff and Moulton, has dis-
cussed principles which are believed to be applicable. 
In the case of Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 
P. 2d 802, the court stated at page 382. 
"So we conclude that here there was a suppres-
sion of the truth, which the party with superior 
knowledge had a duty to disclose, which 
amounted to fraud. 
"One of the fundamental tenets of the 
Anglo-American law of fraud is that fraud may 
be committed by the suppression of the 
truth * * * as well as the suggestion of false-
hood * * * *." 
"Silence, in order to be an actionable fraud, 
must relate to a material matter known to the 
party and which it is his legal du_ty to com-
municate to the other contracting party, 
whether the duty arises from a relation of 
trust from confidence inequality of condition ' ' . and knowledge, or other attendant circum-
stances * * * * ." 
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"The principle is basic in the law of fraud 
as it relates to nondisclosure that a charge of 
fraud is maintainable where a party who 
knows nrnterial facts is under a duty, under the 
circumstances, to speak and disclose his in-
formation, but remains silent * * *." 
The Elder case involved a buyer-seller relation-
ship, and surely the relationship was equally confi-
dential here where Moulton was entrusted with valu-
able property to be sold. 
The court also has enlightening language in 
some of the criminal cases. One of the most recent 
ones points out that the giving of an insufficient funds 
check where there has been no arrangements for 
credit or no funds available to pay the check, is strong 
evidence, in accordance with the statutory language, 
of intent to defraud. Moulton never did have money 
available to make the checks good that he gave to 
Consolidated and repeatedly represented to Consoli-
dated a false state of facts that there was some foul-up 
on the bank's part when he knew there was not. The 
case referred to is Utah u. Coleman, 17 Utah 2d 166, 
+06 P. 2d 308, in which the court unanimously held, 
in an opinion by Justice Crockett, as follows: 
"It is not to be doubted that the making and 
delivering of a check when the maker does not 
have sufficient funds or credit with the bank 
to cover it, in the absence of any other proof, 
is sufficient proof to make a prima facie case 
of intent to defraud as Sec. 76-20-11 provides. 
However, any other evidence b~aring upon the 
accused's intent must be considered. For ex-
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ample, even if he did not have sufficient money 
or credit in the bank at the instant the check 
was made and delivered, if the proof showed 
that he had arranged to have money or credit 
in the bank by the time the check is presented 
for payment, that would negate any intent to 
defraud; and the evidence need raise only a 
reasonable doubt as to his having such intent 
in order to preclude his conviction." 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence is 
clear and convincing that Moulton engaged in fraud-
ulent conduct and that his bond should be available 
to the plaintiff to pay the loss suffered as a result 
of said fraudulent activity. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this court should 
reverse the Trial Court and order judgment entered 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for 
the amount of loss sustained by plaintiff, together 
with a reasonable attorney's fee for the plaintiff's 
attorney. 
Dated this ........ day of ................................ , 1970. 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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